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Tema: This ARI reviews the achievements and set-backs of the 2009 Swedish EU 
Presidency. 
 
 
Resumen: The Swedish EU Presidency during the second half of 2009 delivered few 
surprises, pleasant or otherwise. In style, the Presidency is better characterised by 
pragmatic brokerage than by providing leadership for the Union. Progress was made on a 
number of issues, most notably the ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the adoption of the Stockholm Programme concerning future cooperation in the field 
of freedom, security and justice. Also, the agreements on financial oversight and on a 
tentative exit strategy are worth highlighting, but on all these issues much work remains to 
be done. Among the setbacks, the failure to reach a comprehensive and legally-binding 
deal in Copenhagen on climate change stands out. 
 
 
 
Análisis:  
 
Introduction 
The Swedish Presidency of the EU during the second half of 2009 was launched at a time 
of substantial political and economic uncertainty and this profoundly affected its planning 
and execution. The economic and financial crisis was threatening to bring about not only a 
meltdown of the financial markets but also a prolonged and deep recession: what would 
be considered an appropriate response? The institutional and constitutional uncertainties 
were potentially threatening to bring the Union’s decision-making to a halt: what would the 
best strategy be for different scenarios? A successful conclusion to the climate-change 
negotiations looked increasingly unlikely: how was the Presidency to act to secure the 
necessary deal? These were the most important horizontal questions facing the Swedish 
government when it took up the Presidency in July 2009. Its priorities were therefore:1 
 
• Institutional and constitutional questions 
• Climate change 
• Economy and employment 
• The Stockholm Programme 
• The Baltic Sea Strategy 
• The EU, its neighbourhood and the world 
                                                 
* Researcher, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. 
1 Fredrik Langdal, The Priorities of the Swedish Presidency, ARI nr 133/2009, Elcano Royal Institute. 
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A brief analysis of the progress or lack of progress on each of these priority areas is 
provided below, in rough order of importance.2 However, the analysis has a drawback: it 
is structured following the priorities the Swedish government set itself during its term in 
the Presidency. Other actors will have held a different set of expectations, which could 
constitute an equally valid basis for structuring an account of the Swedish Presidency, but 
with a different content and possibly different conclusions.3 
 
When writing about current affairs one always runs the risk of infusing any analysis with a 
degree of “chauvinism of the present” and thus if anything here is stressed as “important” 
or “serious” it should primarily be seen as a current or short-term attribute. Furthermore, in 
this sort of analysis it is always difficult to disentangle which actors have contributed and 
made a difference and which decisions would have been taken regardless of the country 
holding the rotating Presidency. Would another Presidency have secured a deal on the 
right to mobility for patients; would another Presidency have managed to broker a more 
comprehensive deal on financial oversight and would another Presidency achieve just the 
same result regarding the Stockholm Programme? These questions are of course 
hypothetical, but they do underline the uncertainties inherent to this kind of analysis and 
the risk of stressing too much the Presidency’s importance. 
 
The Institutional and Constitutional Questions 
Undoubtedly, the successful ratification and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is the 
major positive development in the EU during the Swedish Presidency. Although, the 
Presidency’s role in a ratification process is formally very limited, it nevertheless came to 
play an unexpectedly significant part during the autumn. After the verdict of the German 
Constitutional Court on 30 June and the subsequent adjustment of German parliamentary 
participation in EU affairs and the Irish ‘Yes’ vote on 2 October, the road to completing the 
ratification process faced one last hurdle. How big a hurdle it constituted was difficult to 
assess at the time, as the Treaty was submitted a second time to the Czech Constitutional 
Court and the intentions of President Klaus, whose signature was necessary, were 
unknown. 
 
President Klaus’s main concern –apart from being against the Treaty as such– was the 
relationship between the Beneš Decrees and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where 
he feared that the latter would override the former, opening up the possibility for property 
claims from the ethnic German Czechs expelled in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. The Presidency mainly relied on low-key diplomacy rather than on putting public 
political pressure on Klaus, a strategy which, with the benefit of hindsight, turned out to be 
the right course in gaining the sought-after signature. The deal that was struck at the 
European Council meeting was that the Czechs would get an opt-out from the Charter, 
which will be annexed to the next accession treaty, probably with Croatia. 
 
Following the solution to the ratification problems, there was a rapid implementation of the 
Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. Preparing for a possible 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty had kept civil servants and ministers busy since 
before the inception of the Presidency and most of the necessary spadework was 
successfully completed by the end of November. The issues that seem to have caused 
most concern were: (1) the delimitation of power between the posts of High 
                                                 
2 For a one-sided account of progress on a Council-by-Council basis see the Swedish Presidency’s website: 
www.se2009.eu. 
3 See, for instance, EEB’s Assessment of the Environmental Results of the Swedish EU Presidency, July to 
December 2009, Good Ambitions, Disappointing Outcome, 23/XII/2009. 
Area: Europe 
ARI 28/2010 
Date: 3/2/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the President of the European Council 
(see, eg, European Council Decision 2009/882/EU) which will to a substantial extent be 
determined by practice; (2) the setting up of the European External Action Service (see 
Council of the European Union 14930/09) where much work remains; and (3) the 
constitutional anomaly which arose with respect to the number of MEPs with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. One cannot say that these issues were solved during the 
Swedish Presidency but nor did progress stall and several of the issues will continue to 
develop over the years to come. 
 
The Presidency’s challenge in institutional and constitutional spheres was the 
appointment of the Commission President and the two newly-created top jobs under the 
Lisbon Treaty. Despite Durão Barroso’s re-appointment being delayed by the European 
Parliament from July to September, there was never any serious alternative candidate as 
he had the unanimous backing of the heads of State and Government. More controversial 
were both the handling and choice of the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative. The process leading up to the appointments seemed like a relatively 
smooth process, avoiding late-night negotiations, but this was achieved at the price of 
both appointing politicians who epitomised the lowest common denominator and –
according to some accounts– taking the backseat in the negotiations and leaving the 
bigger Member States to sort out an acceptable deal. The appointment of Herman van 
Rompuy and Catherine Ashton was reached unanimously and struck a balance between, 
inter alia, gender, party affiliations and small and large Member States but it should be 
noted that it was much less than many had hoped for. To conclude, one can say that the 
institutional and constitutional questions did not really capture the imagination of the 
Swedish government and in all they were probably seen more as an inconvenience than 
an opportunity. 
 
Climate Change 
As the difficulties were mounting in the climate change negotiations which were to 
culminate at the Copenhagen Conference, the Presidency tried to lower the expectations 
for a comprehensive and legally-binding deal. The Presidency had many tasks in this 
extremely complex multi-level negotiation process amongst which the main ones were to 
uphold internal EU coordination, to secure a deal on climate financing and to represent 
the EU at the negotiating table in Copenhagen. In relation to these tasks the Presidency’s 
performance must be seen as having passed the test even though the desired results 
failed to materialise. First, internal EU coordination was upheld with difficulty despite the 
severe economic crisis. Secondly, an eleventh-hour deal on financing was struck at the 
European Council in December, with the EU pledging €2.4 billion a year over the next 
three years. As it turned out, Sweden will be the fourth-largest contributor to this fast-start 
financing, supporting climate change adaptation in developing countries, behind only the 
UK, France and Germany. This was more ambitious than had been expected a few 
months earlier, according to Durão Barroso. Globally –but including the contributions of 
Japan and the US–, fast-track financing is still around €1 billion short until 2012. However, 
a deal on corresponding long-term financing was not struck. 
 
The result in Copenhagen was, according to the Swedish Environment Minister, ‘a 
disaster’ (European Voice, 22/XII/2009). Without going into the details of the UN political 
declaration which was agreed in Copenhagen, one can say that in essence it entails a 
commitment to the 2ºC target by 2050 without corresponding commitments to cut 
emissions. The EU was negotiating for a 25% reduction of emissions by 2020 compared 
with the level in 1990 but the bids during Copenhagen did not even reach 20%. The two 
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major set-backs for the EU and the Presidency were that no legally-binding deal was 
struck which would commit countries to cut emissions to meet the 2ºC target and that 
there is no timeline for when such a legally-binding treaty is to be signed in the future. If 
one were to seek some good news it is probably that the fast-start financing mentioned 
above seems to be within reach of the target and the increased monitoring of emission 
reductions. 
 
Did the Presidency deliver in relation to the third task, negotiation on behalf of the EU? 
There is still much about the Copenhagen Conference’s negotiating process that remains 
unknown to outsiders, and political scientists interested in tracing its process will have a 
formidably interesting task ahead of them. What can be said at this stage is that most 
observers put the blame for the non-result on the US and China in particular and on the 
UN’s unanimity decision-making system, but criticism has also been levelled at the 
Swedish Presidency from both the domestic opposition and environmental organisations. 
 
The Economic and Financial Crisis 
The challenges relating to the economic and financial crisis were and remain serious and 
multifaceted. The progress –and lack thereof– made in the three main areas that will also 
remain central to the Spanish Presidency are briefly outlined below: financial supervision, 
so-called exit strategies and the EU’s long-term growth strategy. 
 
The agreement in the Council on a new structure for financial oversight is a substantive 
step towards a more stable financial system in Europe even though the final deal was 
watered down by opposition from –mainly– the UK. The agreement on 2 December on a 
general approach was described as a major breakthrough by the Presidency and aims at 
establishing three new authorities for the supervision of financial services in the EU (see 
Council 16885/09 (Presse 357)). However, as the agreement contained the possibility of 
referring certain decisions to the Council and the European Council, which in effect opens 
up for the possibility of vetoing the decisions of the supervisors during a crisis, the 
effectiveness of the proposed system can be called into question. The negotiations with 
the European Parliament are likely to be fierce as the four largest groups in the parliament 
have rejected the agreement and it will thus be the task of the Spanish Presidency to try 
to steer it through the next steps of the legislative process. 
 
The concept of exit strategies falls partly within the Presidency’s priority of returning to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. One exit strategy concerns the ending of 
extraordinary measures in the financial markets, where the agreement entails that these 
should be phased out depending on the situation in each country and where general 
guarantee programmes are the first to be abolished. The other exit strategy is probably of 
more profound significance and concerns stimulus measures and the return to sustainable 
public finances. The divisions between the Member States as to the timing of this 
phasing-out have been a significant headache for the Swedish Presidency, which 
advocated a rapid transition in contrast to, for instance, Spain which argued that it is too 
early to set any dates. A rather vague deal was brokered by the Presidency which 
entailed that, given self-sustained recovery, fiscal consolidation should start in 2011 at the 
latest and that consolidation should go beyond a benchmark of 0.5% of GDP a year 
(Council Conclusions on fiscal exit strategy, 20/X/2009, and European Council 
Conclusions, 10-11/XII/2009). Setting down the general principles is, however, very 
different from a possible future implementation of those principles, and it is likely that this 
issue will remain contested during the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio. 
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Finally, the EU 2020 Strategy –the successor to the Lisbon Strategy–, which is to address 
the long-term structural challenges facing the European economy, is to be approved 
during the Spanish Presidency. The Swedish Presidency prioritised ‘preparing and setting 
the framework’ of the strategy (EurActiv, 29/VI/2009). It is difficult to assess the impact the 
Swedish Presidency has had on the consultation paper (COM(2009)647 final) which was 
presented by the Commission, but the claim that ‘[T]he Presidency has set the scene for 
economic growth in the EU in the coming decade’ (www.se2009.eu) made by the Finance 
Minister seems close to hyperbole. What can be said to be at least in line with the 
Swedish government’s priorities is the emphasis on environmental and fiscal sustainability 
and increased employment within the strategy, although the Presidency’s impact seems 
weak. 
 
A concluding question for further analysis is the impact on Sweden’s room for manoeuvre 
in the economic field of the fact that it is not a member of the euro zone. Would arguments 
concerning exit strategies and a return to the stability pact have carried more weight had 
Sweden been a euro-insider? These questions will be particularly interesting to follow 
during the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies. 
 
The Stockholm Programme 
The adoption of the Stockholm programme, which is the framework for cooperation within 
the fields of, inter alia, criminal and civil law, police cooperation, migration and asylum, is 
a tangible result of the Swedish Presidency (see Annex to Council of the European Union 
17024/09). Even though it is a comprehensive programme, hence making it difficult to 
single out particular features, it is worth mentioning a few of the central aims agreed upon. 
First, there is an agreement –or at least the ambition– to complete the common asylum 
system by 2012, which has been an important aim of the Swedish government, as has the 
creation of a system for labour immigration. Secondly, the internal security strategy may 
prove to have far reaching implications, not least regarding the balance between data 
collection and data protection. Finally, the harmonisation efforts concerning the creation of 
a judicial area, which will entail, in particular, further efforts to increase mutual recognition 
in the field of criminal and civil law. In the latter case this will, for example, mean 
extending mutual recognition to new fields as yet untouched such as ‘succession and 
wills, matrimonial property rights, and the property consequences of the separation of 
couples…’ (ibid., p. 24), which are likely to prove highly controversial. 
 
This is the sort of programme that will attract criticism whatever level of ambition is agreed 
upon, as it touches the core of state functions. The outcome has been criticised for being 
a missed opportunity for re-launching the integration process and providing a new 
narrative for the EU, but also for failing to address human rights problems within the EU 
and for creating a dangerous surveillance and control system. Whether the balance struck 
in the final unanimous agreement is the right one, is of course dependent on one’s views 
on future integration in this area, but what can be said at this point is that the Spanish 
Presidency will have to maintain a difficult balance between a number of conflicting aims 
and policies and that it is unlikely that this can be done in a way that will satisfy all or even 
most of the stakeholders. 
 
The Baltic Sea Strategy 
The adoption of the Baltic Sea Strategy by the European Council in late October has in 
contrast to the Stockholm programme been a relatively uncontroversial process. As a truly 
endogenous priority of the Swedish Presidency, the strategy is the first intra-EU macro-
regional strategy and has thus far aroused interest more in terms of form than content and 
Area: Europe 
ARI 28/2010 
Date: 3/2/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
process rather than policy. The idea behind the strategy is that macro regions within the 
EU share common problems and potentials, which are of less relevance to the Union’s 
other Member States. These problems and potentials should –according to this logic– 
best be tackled through regional voluntary cooperation within the EU institutional 
framework. The Strategy is structured around four pillars –including environment and 
safety and security– and is accompanied by an Action Plan which contains some 80 
flagship projects (see Council 13744/09 and Commission SEC(2009) 712). The criticism 
which has been voiced over the Strategy includes its lack of an external dimension, its 
lack of additional funding and the risks associated with an intra-regionalisation of the EU 
(Bengtsson, 2009, and Schymik & Krumrey, 2009). 
 
The EU, its Neighbourhood and the World 
As the last of the Presidencies held under the old framework, the international dimension 
has been present and visible, with summits with, among others, the US, Russia and India, 
while a steady stream of foreign dignitaries passed through Stockholm during the autumn 
of 2009. The international limelight is bound to shift to Brussels under the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Spanish government’s strategy will be closely watched by the Member States. As 
the appointments to the top jobs showed, Member States are not overly keen to be shut 
out of the foreign policy loop and the presence (or absence) of Spaniards may well set the 
precedent which others will have to follow. 
 
In the absence of a major crisis, this brief analysis outlines the developments related to 
enlargement and free trade, although the adoption of an EU strategy for Afghanistan is 
also well worth mentioning. Swedish political parties are broadly supportive of the further 
enlargement of the EU and it was surprising to some to see that enlargement was not 
given a more prominent place in the Presidency’s priorities. However, the enlargement 
process has ticked on without any major upsets, which under the present mood of 
enlargement fatigue must be seen as an achievement. The accession of Croatia is inching 
forward and the Swedish Presidency has received –and gladly accepted– membership 
applications from both Iceland and Serbia. Furthermore, the environment chapter in the 
accession negotiations with Turkey was opened. Thus, the pragmatic and low-key 
approach seems to have served the enlargement process in the short term but support for 
accession is not likely to rise unless political leaders from all over the EU start to argue 
the case loud and clear and actually lead on the issue. As the prospect of membership for 
the countries included in the Eastern Partnership remains elusive it seems that the 
Swedish and other pro-enlargement governments are currently not succeeding in making 
their case. 
 
There has also been some notable progress on the issue of visa-free travel for the 
citizens of the Western Balkan countries. As of 19 December the citizens of Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia have visa-free access to the EU, while the pace of progress 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been slower than for its neighbours. 
 
Finally, the Swedish Presidency prioritised the issue of free trade and here the results are 
meagre in relation to the admittedly high expectations regarding –especially– the Doha 
Round. The most tangible result was the free-trade agreement which was concluded with 
South Korea –although this may still be blocked by the EP under the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions–, but agreeing on a negotiating mandate for free trade agreements with 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are also important steps forward. Also of interest is the 
agreement reached on the issue of bananas with Latin America and the US, a discord 
which has been running for nearly two decades. However, the failure to make any 
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substantial progress with the Doha Round is of course disappointing for the Swedes and 
others, although steps forward have been taken on the process, where the aim now is to 
reach an agreement in 2010. As in the case of the climate change negotiations, outlined 
above, the blame lies not primarily with the Presidency or with the EU, but with US 
domestic politics and multilateralism dependant on unanimous decision-making. 
 
Conclusions: So how are we to rate the Swedish Presidency and what will be its long-
term legacy for the EU and short-term bequest for the 2010-11 Trio? When looking at the 
ratings by foreign and Swedish analysts of the Swedish Presidency there seems to be a 
relative consensus that the Swedes have passed the test but not resolved all the 
challenges. Whether policy outcomes are considered to be good depends largely on 
ideology and expectations. For instance, financial regulation is being developed under 
Swedish chairmanship, but the extent to which the content of the package is too Anglo-
Saxon or intergovernmentalist depends on preferences and expectations. It also seems 
that the Trio-coordination between the French, Czechs and Swedes has not really been 
very effective or important and there also seems to be a lack of effective coordination 
between the Trios. 
 
Generally, one can say with some certainty that the Swedish Presidency can be described 
as pragmatic rather than dogmatic and as a low-profile broker rather than a leader. Thus it 
seems that the outcomes are not especially infused with Swedish preferences beyond the 
preference to reach agreement. Some of the results outlined above reflect final outcomes 
but in which developing practices will be very important, while others have only 
progressed some important steps in the policy process but their final results remain to be 
decided, so any verdict is by nature provisional. The short term results –or lack of results– 
that will be of importance to the Spanish/Belgian/Hungarian trio include the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular setting up a functioning External Action 
Service and a functional division of powers between different actors, especially in the field 
of foreign policy. In the field of economic and financial affairs, concluding the negotiations 
on the new financial oversight structure will be important as will the transformation of 
general guidelines regarding the exit strategy to actual policies in the Member States. The 
Stockholm Programme will need to be translated into an action programme and while the 
Baltic Sea Strategy will require little action from the incoming Trio, both the enlargement 
process and climate change policies will need the wholehearted support of the next 
Presidencies in order to progress. A long-term legacy is of course more difficult to predict 
and less likely to materialise but in a sense the successful ratification and entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty during the Swedish Presidency will make a lasting impact on the EU, 
although it is too early to assess how important a role the Swedes actually played. In 
terms of policy, the agreement and the content of the Stockholm Programme will also 
profoundly influence the Union in the years to come. Finally, the concept of macro-
regional cooperation seems to have captured the imagination of policy-makers around the 
EU and there will be other initiatives modelled on the Baltic Sea Strategy. A model has 
thus been set during the Presidency, but it will take a number of years before we can 
properly assess if this new mode of cooperation has proved efficient and progressive in 
terms of outcome and, indeed, if it will actually serve as a model for others to follow. 
 
Fredrik Langdal 
Researcher, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
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